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Abstract: Based on the sharing mode of supply chain resources in the environment of cloud service, this research 
constructed the evolutionary game model of supply chain resource-sharing to reveal the behaviors between two types of 
enterprise, the equilibrium in model and local stability are analyzed under the state of uniform mixed and non-uniform mixed 
populations. By using the method of system dynamics, the evolutionary game model is built, and a contrastive analysis of 
evolutionary results affected by diverse parametric variations is performed. The results of the research shows that the 
evolutionary trends of the game are significantly influenced by the initial sharing proportion in enterprise group, the cost and 
benefit of upgrading equipment, and the risk of technological loss. To facilitate the information interaction and resource 
sharing between enterprises, continuous improvement needed to be done in line with the above aspects. 
 
Keywords: cloud platform, sharing of supply chain resource, evolutionary game, system dynamics model 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, the development of information technology has transformed the competition between 
enterprises into the competition of global supply chain
[1]
, and the overall competitiveness of the supply chain 
can be achieved through the coordinated development between the members. One of the conditions for 
synergetic development lies in the circulation and sharing of resources. At the same time, with the advancement 
of information technologies such as Internet of Things and cloud computing, the cloud service platform makes 
the seamless connection of information and resources among supply chain enterprises accessible
[2]
. All of this 
can build a virtual enterprise alliance, and jointly improve product quality and enhance the overall 
competitiveness of the supply chain. However, the information among members of the supply chain is not open 
and opaque, besides, the conditions that companies capitalize on supply chain member’s core competencies and 
protect their own knowledge and technology are widespread, which leads to the low willingness of sharing the 
supply chain resources, so it is hard to form an effective community of supply chains. Therefore, it is of 
theoretical and practical significance to study how to maximize the benefits of supply chain members under the 
premise of ensuring the overall interests of supply chain cooperative organizations. 
 
2. LITURATURE REVIEW 
Up to now, the research on supply chain resource sharing mainly includes the following two aspects. First, 
the impact of resource sharing on the performance of supply chain operations, the representative paper are, 
Frank Chen
[3]
(2000) explored the degree of variation of the variance var(q
k
) of orders placed in the kth stage of 
the supply chain relative to the variance of market demand var(D) under the pattern of demand determination 
and uncertainty, indicating that resource sharing can significantly increase the performance of supply chain 
operations. However, most of the literatures focuses on the distribution of benefits between resource sharing 
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parties, Fu Heng
[4]
(2018) argues that wholesale price of the manufacturer and retailer's pricing strategy are the 
main factors that determine the distribution of benefits between the supply chain, they constructed a single 
manufacturer-retailer supply chain system to discuss the each pricing strategy for manufacturer and retailer to 
find out the best distribution point of interest under the uncertainty market demand, and verify the existence of 
utility equilibrium in the optimal decision. Based on the retailer's risk appetite, Wang Cong and Yang 
Deli
[5]
(2017) studied the conditions that tradition retailer sharing demand information with manufacturers, and 
discussed the impact of information resource sharing on their business decisions and profits of both retailers and 
manufacturers. And numerical simulations showed that resource sharing can maximize the benefits of both 
parties only when the demand is uncertain. Lu Jizhou, Feng Gengzhong
[6]
(2017) Aiming at the problem of 
bullwhip effect in the supply chain inventory, they established a cooperative game model covering the individual 
utility function and the overall collaborative optimization of the supplier and the retailer, and transforms the 
equilibrium of the resource allocation in the game community into the optimal decision balance, to ensure that 
the sharing of resources can maximize the interests of both parties. 
However, most of the existing literature focuses on the decision of resource sharing through the distribution 
of benefits. But there is a lack of discussion on the factors that limit the resource sharing between supply chains, 
and the influence of different situations on the final decision behavior is also lack of argument. In addition, the 
resource sharing among supply chain is a dynamic process, the dynamic changes of sharing factors will 
ultimately affects the choice of a balanced strategy for both supply chains. Therefore, this study adopts the 
evolutionary game method to analyze the evolution trend of the dynamic cooperation process of resource 
sharing among supply chain members in the cloud service environment, and measure the impact of various 
factors on the equilibrium strategy in different situations by using system dynamic simulation model. 
 
3. THE FRAMEWORK OF EVOLUTIONARY GAME MODEL 
 
3.1 Problem description 
Enterprises can access various resources that are lacked in the enterprise through the resource sharing 
platform, but they needed to pay a certain access costs, and bear the risk of the leakage of core technologies, but 
they may also obtain excess returns. This research draw lessons from the game method that Qi Ershi used to 
analysis the resource sharing between manufacturers, we assumes that the main body of sharing supply chain 
resources are two types of "group" enterprises, one type of enterprises mainly share hard manufacturing 
resources(denoted as enterprises group A), and the other type is based on sharing soft service resources(recorded 
as enterprises group B). The strategies among both of them are S{shared, not shared}, and both sides of the 
game are "bounded rationally". The evolutionary game model is constructed by the strategies and benefits of 
both sides to study the evolution of the result of both parties under the condition of homogeneous and 
heterogeneous mixed groups. 
 
3.2 Model assumption 
(1) If both group A and group B does not share enterprise’s resources, both parties produce and operate 
independently, the income earned by group A is Pa and that of group B is Pb. 
(2) If group A share enterprise resources while group B do not, group A needed to invest a lot of fixed costs 
to purchase or upgrade existing material-sensing devices, denoted as Ca. At this point, although there is no 
platform for the cooperation information between supply chain enterprises, but the production and information 
level of group A has been improved, the proceeds will also change accordingly, here the degree of enterprise 
informatization is Ra, from the extra income brought by the improvement of information technology was 
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recorded as Ia, while that of the group B was still Pb. 
(3) If group B share enterprise resources while group A do not, group B are mainly rely on back-end 
productive service businesses in the supply chain and have a higher level of informationization, so the cost of 
investment in upgrading devices of group B is less than group A, marked as Cb. However, group B have to bear 
the risk of the leakage of core technologies. Therefore, the loss risk factor for group B is recorded as Rb, and the 
losses due to technological loss is recorded as Lb. The income of group A is still Pa. 
(4) If both group A and B share enterprise resources, group A not only update their own devices, but also 
obtained support from the advanced production technology and other resources, the degree of enterprise 
informatization is increased to R
s
a. On the other hand, through mutual complementation of sharing resources 
between both parties, the efficiency of product production is increased, the production cost is reduced, and the 
market competitiveness of products is enhanced. Both types of enterprises have obtained excess returns, namely 
P
s
a and P
s
b. At the same time, group B and A signed a collaborative manufacturing contract to reduce the risk of 
technology loss, the loss of risk in this case is denoted R
s
b. 
(5)  is the proportion of individuals who choose to share enterprise resources in group A. 1 is the 
proportion of individuals who choose not in the group A; y is the proportion of individuals choosing to share the 
enterprise resources in group B, and 1y is the proportion of individuals who choose not. 
 
3.3 Solve the model 
3.3.1 Homogeneous mixed evolution game model 
In a standard homogeneous mixed replication dynamic system, the population size is assumed to be infinite 
and the probability of contact between population individuals is the same
[7]
. According to the hypothesis of the 
above several variables, we can get the game payment matrix shown in Table 1. 
Table 1.  Evolutionary game payment matrix of supply chain enterprises. 
  
Share  
Group B 
   Not share 
    
  
Group A 
              Proportion                y                                1y 
Share                            PsaCa+R
s
aIa,          Pa-Ca+RaIa, 
                                  Psb-Cb-R
s
bLb                Pb 
Not share        1               Pa，Pb-Cb-RbLb                Pa，Pb 
Among them, P
s
a>Pa，P
s
b>Pb，R
s
a>Ra，R
s
b<Rb。 
The income of group A choose and choose not to share the enterprise resources respectively are: 
I
s
a=y(P
s
aCa+R
s
aIa)+( 1y)( Pa-Ca+RaIa)      (1) 
I
n
a=yPa+(1y)Pa      (2) 
Therefore, the average income of group A is: 
Ia=  I
s
a+(1) I
n
a     (3) 
By the same token, the income of group B choose to share and not share are respectively as follows: 
I
s
b=(P
s
b-Cb-R
s
bLb)+(1)(Pb-Cb-RbLb  (4)                                               
I
n
b=Pb+(1)Pb       (5) 
Therefore, the average income of group B is: 
Ib= y I
s
b+(1y) I
n
b      (6) 
According to Malthusian dynamic equation
[8]
, the strategy adjustment process can be simulated by 
replicating dynamic mechanism. So the replication dynamic equation of group A and B are: 
F(χ)= (IsaIa)=(1)(I
s
aI
n
a)=(1)[y(P
s
aCa+R
s
aIa)+(1y)(Pa-Ca+RaIa)Pa]      (7) 
F(y)=y(I
s
b Ib)=y(1y)( I
s
b I
n
b)= y(1y)[ ( P
s
b-Cb-R
s
bLb)+ (1) (Pb-Cb-RbLb)Pb]  (8) 
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Copying the dynamic steady state means that the proportion of game parties adopting both strategies 
remains constant. So when F(x)=0 and F(y)=0, we can get the five equilibrium points of the evolutionary game 
process, respectively are, O（0,0），A（0,1），B（1,0），C（1,1），D（D，yD） , among them, XD=
bb
s
bbb
s
bbb
LRRPP
LRc
)( 
 , yD=
aaa
s
aa
s
aaa
IRRPP
IRC
)( 
 . And when =0，=1 or y=
aaa
s
aa
s
aaa
IRRPP
IRC
)( 
 , the 
probability of choosing a "share" strategy for group A is stable, while y=0，y=1 or =
bb
s
bbb
s
bbb
LRRPP
LRc
)( 
 , 
the probability of choosing a "share" strategy for group B is stable. Thus, the stability of evolutionary game 
equilibrium can be obtained by Friedman's Jacobian matrix stability decision method
[9]
. Deriving F (χ) and F (y) 
from partial derivatives of χ and y respectively, we get the Jacobian matrix of the system as follows: 
J= 
 
               
 
                                
 
 
    
 
                 
               
 
                           
 
      
 
                        
  
consequently, we can get the stability analysis of five equilibrium points on the basis of the Jacobi ratio of 
the matrix stability analysis showed in Table 2. Because  and y represent the probability of a strategy for both 
sides of the game to choose, so 01, 0y1, then the constraints conditions are available: Cb+RbLb0, 
P
s
bPb+(RbR
s
b)Lb0, CaRaLa0, P
s
aPa+(R
s
aRa)La0.  
Table2.  Balance point and local stability. 
Balance point        DetJ                   Symbol            TrJ            Symbol            Result  
 0(0,0)        (CaRaIa)(Cb+RbIb)                +          Ca+RaIaCbRbIb                     ESS 
A(0,1)  (Psa—Pa—Ca+R
s
aIa)( P
s
b—Pb—Cb+R
s
bIb)   —          P
s
a—Pa—Ca+R
s
aIa             +             Not stable 
 B(1,0)      —(CaRaIa) (Cb+RbIb)               —         P
s
b—Pb—Cb+R
s
bIb         +             Not stable 
C(1,1)   (Psa—Pa—Ca+R
s
aIa)( P
s
b—Pb—Cb+R
s
bIb)     +               —P
s
b+Pb+Cb+R
s
bIb            —             ESS 
D(
       
            
 
    
,   
   —      
 
 —  —    
 
   
   —       —     
 
       
                 
)     
          
 
 —  —  — 
 
   
   —     
 
 —     
      +                0                 /           Saddle point 
Through the stability analysis we can see that there are 2 out of 5 equilibrium points are evolutionary 
stability strategy (ESS), respectively, they are O (0,0) point and the C (1,1) point which meet the conditions 
DetJ>0 and TrJ<0. So the corresponding strategy is {share, share} and {not share, not share}. A (0,1) and B (1,0) 
are unbalanced point, D (
bb
s
bbb
s
bbb
LRRPP
LRc
)( 
 ,
aaa
s
aa
s
aaa
IRRPP
IRC
)( 
 ) are Saddle point. Analysis shows 
that the dynamics game eventually converges to individuals in both types of group select share enterprise 
resources O (0,0) or choose not to share enterprise resources C (1,1) those two equilibrium points, and which 
direction does saddle point move is decided by the system initial state, the income that companies share 
enterprise resources, the investment costs access to cloud service platform, the improvement of information 
technology and technology losses and other factors that affect the common role. Two groups of enterprises can 
adjust and control their own implementation of enterprise resource sharing costs, information gains number, the 
risk of technological loss coefficient and other parameters to make the dynamic game process moves towards 
the ideal equilibrium point, promoting enterprise to share resources under cloud service environment. 
3.3.2 Heterogeneous mixed evolution game model 
In the actual situation, the number of a population is limited, and the rate of contact between individuals are 
different
[10]
. So according to Taylor
[11]
(2006), QuanJi
[12]
(2013) research on non-uniform contact rate, our study 
record the contact rate of group A and B choose shared strategy between individuals as R11, the contact rate 
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between individuals who choose shared strategy in group A and choose not share in group B is R12, the contact 
rate between individuals who choose shared strategy in group B and who do not in group A recorded as R21, the 
contact rate between individuals who choose not share in both group A and B recorded as R22. 
For the convenience of the model, set a=P
s
aCa+R
s
aIa, ya=Pa-Ca+RaIa, Wa=Za=Pa, b=P
s
b-Cb-R
s
bLb, 
yb=Zb=Pb, Wb= Pb-Cb-RbLb. 
In this way, the game revenue matrix for supply chain resource sharing of two groups of enterprises in the 
cloud service environment can be expressed as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
        
              
  
From the perspective of group A, in the condition of non-uniform contact rate, the income of group A 
choose to share and not share the enterprise resources are: 
I
s
a=
x)(1RxR
x)(1RyxRx
1211
12a11a
—
—


, I
n
a=
)1(
)1(
2221
2221
xRxR
xRZxRW aa
—
—


  (10) 
So according to the copying equation F(x)=(IsaIa)=(1)(I
s
aI
n
a), we can conclude that: 
I
s
a—I
n
a=
)]1()][1([
2--
22211211
2




RRRR
）（）（            (11) 
Among them,, δ=(xaZa)R11R12+R12R21(yaWa), =(xaWa)R11R21, =(yaZa)R12R22. Set as 
h(χ)=(+δ)χ2+(δ2)χ+, T(χ)= χ(1χ)(IsaI
n
a). 
And then let h(x)=0, when24, we can conclude that: 
X1=
)(2
42 2



 ，         X2=
)(2
42 2



      (12) 
Divided into three cases, we discussed the evolutionary stability on the value of the proceeds of group A: 
(1) When (a—ya)(Wa—Za) and (a—Wa)(ya—Za) are both positive number, 
 or 
2
2112
2211
))(())((











aa
aaaaaaaa
Z
ZWZW
RR
RR

  , 
24. 
In this situation, if aWa, yaZa, the =0 is unstable while =1 is stable, at this time, , 0. But if  and 

 
 
, so 12, at this point, 1 is the stable balanced point while 2 is the unstable point. In other word, it means 
when aWa= P
s
aCa+R
s
aIaPa0, ya—Za=RaIaCa0, and  , 
 
 
, 0→1←2→1. On the other hand, if aWa, 
yaZa, =0 is stable while =1 is unstable, at this time, , 0. But if  and 
 
 
, so 12, at this point, 1 is the 
stable balanced point while 2 is the unstable point. In other word, it means when aWa= P
s
aCa+R
s
aIaPa0, 
yaZa=RaIaCa0, and  , 
δ
 
, 0←2→1←1. 
     (2) When (aya)(WaZa) and (aWa)(yaZa) are both positive number, 
.4
))(())(())(())((
2
2
2112
2211
2



























，
aa
aaaaaaaq
aa
aaaaaaaq
Z
ZWZW
RR
RR
Z
ZWZW      
Under this circumstance, there are only two balanced point in evolutionary game system, respectively are: 
=0 and =1. 
So if aWa, yaZa. the =0 is unstable while =1 is stable. In other word, it means when 
P
s
aCa+R
s
aIaPa0 and RaIaCa0, 0→1.But if aWa, yaZa, the =0 is stable while =1 is unstable. In other 
word, it means when P
s
aCa+R
s
aIaPa0 and RaIaCa0, 0←1. 
(3) When (aya)(WaZa) and (aWa)(yaZa) are negative number, or (aya)(WaZa) is positive number, 
(aWa)(yaZa) is negative number, 
24 is permanently established under this circumstance. 
So if aWa, yaZa, the =0 and =1 both are stable. At this point, 0 and 0, 2 is the stable balanced 
point. it means when P
s
aCa+R
s
aIaPa0 and RaIaCa0, 0←2→1. But if aWa, yaZa, the =0 and =1 both are 
stable. At this point, 0 and 0, 1 is the stable balanced point, it means when P
s
aCa+R
s
aIaPa0 and 
     
2
2221
1211











aa
aaaaaaaa
Z
ZWZW
RR
RR


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RaIaCa0, 0→1←1. 
Here, since the group B only differ in their strategic returns from the group A, so they will not be discussed 
again. In the case, for non-uniform contact rate, the evolutionary result is related to the contact rate only when 
(aya)(WaZa) and (aWa)(yaZa) are both positive. In other cases, the contact rate only change the position of 
1 or 2. Because in the income matrix, Wa=Za=Pa , so (aya)(WaZa) = 0, indicating that the contact rate in the 
system only changes the position of the saddle point without changing the direction of the evolutionary result. 
This also means that when group A chooses the strategy of not share the resources, increasing or decreasing the 
contact rate between group A and B only affect the process of evolution but won’t affect the evolutionary result. 
 
4. SD MODEL OF THE EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY AND ITS SIMULATION ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 Simulation analysis of the SD model 
    Use Vensim PLE 6.3 to establish the evolutionary game model of sharing enterprise resource under cloud 
service environment. According to the above analysis, the simulation process in this paper fixed most of the 
initial value under the premise, from the initial sharing probability, upgrading equipment costs and profit, and 
technology loss risk factor those three aspects, and with the adjustment of the parameter size, observe the impact 
of its changes on the evolutionary results. 
(1) The influence of the change of initial sharing probability on evolutionary results 
Assuming that the INITIAL TIME=0, FINAL TIME=30, TIME STEP=0.5, Pas=2.2, Pa=1.2, Ca=0.4, Ia=0.6, 
ras=0.8, ra=0.4, Pbs=2, Pb=1, Cb=0.2, Lb=0.6, rbs=0.1, rb=0.2. With the given initial probability =0.3 of choosing 
the shared strategy in group B, we divided the initial probability of choosing the shared strategy in group A into 
0.1, 0.4, 0.7 and 0.9, and then observe the changes in the probability of choosing shared strategies between the 
two types of enterprises. The results can be seen in Fig.1 that when the initial probability of group B is fixed, the 
trend of evolution of the probability choosing the shared strategy of group A is more significantly affected by 
their initial probabilities. When the initial sharing probability  is higher, the evolution rate of the probability 
value converging to 1 is also relatively fast. And also when the initial sharing probability  of group A is higher, 
the sharing probability of group B will converges to 1; on the contrary, the sharing probability of group B 
converges to 0, Shown in Fig.2.(among them, =10% represent —1—1—1—1—; =40% represent 
—2—2—2—2—; =70% is —3—3—3—3—; =90% is —4—4—4—4—, and the following is equivalent) 
 
The sharing probability  of group A              The sharing probability  of group B: 
Fig. 1 The influence of the changes of the initial   Fig. 2 The influence of the changes of the initial 
value  on the sharing probability of group A.      value  on the sharing probability of group B. 
    (2) The impact of the cost and profit of changing the equipment on the evolutionary result 
In the other parameters remains the same conditions, we adjust the upgrade equipment cost Ca from the 
initial 0. 4 to 0. 6 and 0. 9, then get the evolution result shown in Figure3,4. Compared with the Figure 1, when 
the cost of upgrading equipment in group A gradually increases, the probability of choosing the sharing strategy 
converge to 1 decreases. In particular, when Ca = 0.9, group A with the initial probability 0.4 will eventually 
converge to 0, which means that group A will choose to abandon the strategy of sharing enterprise resources on 
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the premise of higher equipment cost. Besides, because the profits is mainly brought by the information 
improvement factor, so we set improvement factor of information sharing ras of group A rise from the initial 0. 8 
to 0.9, and the information improvement coefficient ra rise from the initial 0.4 to 0.6, as shown in Figure 5,6. At 
this point, the rate of shared probability in group A convergence to 1 is accelerated compared with that of Figure 
4, the more prominent change is that the initial shared probability α=0.1 converges to 1 in Fig.6. From this we 
can see that enterprises promote information construction will not only enhance the efficiency of business 
operation, but also serve as an important guarantee for the cooperation among supply chains. 
 
The sharing probability  of group A              The sharing probability  of group A 
           Fig.3 The evolution results of the sharing        Fig.4 The evolution results of the sharing  
            probability in group A when Ca=0.6.             probability in group A when Ca=0.9. 
 
             The sharing probability  of group A               The sharing probability  of group A 
Fig.5 The evolution results of the shared         Fig.6 The evolution results of the shared  
        probability in group A when ras=0.8, ra=0.4.      probability in group A when ras=0.9, ra=0.6. 
(3) Effect of risk factors of technological loss on evolutionary results 
we adjust the technology loss risk factor from rbs=0.1 to rbs=0.4, then observe the evolutionary result of the 
shared probability in group B. Comparing Figure 7 with Figure 8, it is not difficult to find that the increase of 
technology loss risk greatly reduces the rate of initial value β=0. 5 and β=0. 8 converges to 1, and initial value 
β=0. 3 finally converges to zero. This shows that the probability of choosing a sharing strategy for group B will 
decrease as the risk of technology loss increases. When the coefficient increases to a certain extent, the 
enterprise will undoubtedly choose a strategy of not sharing enterprise resources.(=0.1 is —1—1—1—, =0.3 
is —2—2—2—, =0.5 is —3—3—3—, =0.8 is —4—4—4—) 
 
             The sharing probability  of group B                The sharing probability  of group B 
            Fig.7 The evolution results of the shared          Fig.8 The evolution results of the shared  
              probability in group B when rbs=0.1.            probability in group B when rbs=0.4. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
From the perspective of evolutionary game, this study constructed a strategy selection model of sharing 
enterprise resources, and uses the method of system dynamics to simulate the model dynamically. The impact of 
different factors on the evolutionary results is compared and analyzed. Through the discussion, supply chain 
members can adjust the contact rate between enterprises to make the evolutionary results more favored. Besides, 
the guiding effect brought by the construction of resource sharing platform and business alliances will make 
other businesses produce follow-up behavior, which help form the industry rules. And the ration between cost 
and benefit access to cloud platform is the main factor that enterprise consider when sharing resources, the 
technology loss risk factor also takes a part. But our research also has some disadvantages, as a resource sharing 
third-party intermediary, the model in our research didn’t include the factors involving cloud service platform 
provider, besides, the coordinated development of multi-cooperation is also widespread and it makes the 
evolutionary game model more complex. All of this are the directions of our next research. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
This research has been supported by the technical innovation special project of Hubei Science and 
Technology Program (soft science research) (2017ADC103), the general project of Research base for 
Humanities and Social Sciences in Hubei Province - Research Center of Enterprise Decision Support 
(DSS20170302), the general program of China Logistics Society and China Federation of Logistics & 
Purchasing (2018CSLKT3-068), and the research project of graduate teaching reform for Wuhan Textile 
University (2017023). 
 
REFERENCES 
[1] Qi Ershi. (2011).Industrial Engineering and Manufacturing Information[M]. Beijin: Machinery Industry Press, 85. 
[2] Tong S.(2008).Contracting and information sharing under supply chain competition. Management Science,45(4):701-715 
[3] Chen F, Drezner Z. (2000).Quantifying the bullwhip effect in a single supply chain:The impact of forecasting, lead time 
and information. Management Science, 46(3): 436-443. 
[4] Heng F, Ming J. (2018).The effect of scale economy on supply chain information transaction decision. Journal of System 
Science, 26(2): 111-116. In Chinese. 
[5] Deli Y, Chong W. (2017).A study of information sharing in dual-channel supply chain with risk preference retailer. 
Industrial Engineering and Management, 22(2): 83-88. In Chinese. 
[6] Jizhou L, Gengzhong F, et al. (2017).Factors affecting bullwhip effect of inventory under information sharing. Journal of 
Management Science in China, 20(3): 137-147. In Chinese. 
[7] Peter M M. (2007).A brief history of system dynamics in continental Europe. System Dynamics Review, 23(2): 215- 218. 
[8] Galor O, Weil D N. (2000).Population, technology, and growth: from Malthusian stagnation to the demographic 
transition and beyond. American economic review, 17(3): 806-828. 
[9] Friedman D. (1991).Evolutionary games in economics. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society,21(3): 637-666 
[10] Jia LuK, Li WenL. (2008). Study of evolutionary stability of a copy equation under non-uniform contact rate. Journal of 
Lanzhou University (Natural Science Edition), 44(4): 93- 98. In Chinese. 
[11] Taylor C, Nowak M A. (2006).Evolutionary game dynamics with non-uniform interaction rates. Theoretical Population 
Biology, (69): 243- 252. 
[12] Quan J, Wang X J. (2013).Some analytical properties of the model for stochastic evolutionary games in finite 
populations with non-uniform interaction rate. Communications in Theoretical Physics, 60(1): 37-47. In Chinese. 
